













Transit submarine pipelines:  
balancing the coastal and laying States’ jurisdiction in 
























Small Master’s Thesis 
Masters of Laws in Law of the Sea 
University of Tromsø 






The international regulation of submarine pipelines transiting another State’s exclusive 
economic zone and continental shelf other than the laying State is largely non-existent, 
outside of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Therefore, the 
study of how that Convention governs this issue area is crucial. The present thesis asks 
questions related to the rights and duties of the coastal State as well as the laying State. 
Especially scrutinised is Article 79 of the LOS Convention and how it creates balance 
between these two types of States. The questions raised concern the content of the 
freedom to lay submarine pipelines on the one hand, and the grounds of the limitations 
placed thereupon on the other hand.  
 
The thesis concludes that the LOS Convention creates a balance between coastal and 
laying State’s interests, rights and duties. However, more needs to be done to create and 
harmonise a uniform set of standards regulating the laying and maintenance of 
submarine pipelines.  
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PART I – INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Research problem 
 
The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereafter referred to as the LOS 
Convention or the Convention)1 is the constitution of the seas covering, as it purports in 
its Preamble, all issue areas in the field of the law of the sea.2 As the LOS Convention is 
a framework, further, more precise rules and standards are elaborated in other 
conventions and under the auspices of different international organizations, thus 
complementing the framework.3 Yet, one issue area has been painfully neglected and 
that is the regulation of submarine pipelines. The significance of submarine pipelines 
has been showcased by the Nord Stream Pipeline project connecting Russia and Europe, 
as well as the increasing exploitation of oil and gas resources offshore. In spite of their 
importance, the LOS Convention devotes considerably less articles to submarine 
pipelines than to other issue areas, while further regulation in separate legal instruments 
is lacking.  
 
Because of the under-developed regulation of submarine pipelines relative to other issue 
areas, the focus of the present thesis is directed at the provisions contained in the LOS 
Convention as these have to be the starting point in any further legislative development.  
 
1.2 Research topic 
 
The question of how to regulate submarine pipelines is broad in geographical sense as 
well as in the sense that there are multiple functions of pipelines with separate ways of 
regulating them. The present thesis is focused specifically on the regulation of transiting 
submarine pipelines in the coastal State’s exclusive economic zone and on its 
                                                 
1 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Signed 10th December 1982, Montego Bay. Entered into 
force 16th November 1994 
2 LOSC Preamble, Paragraph 1 
3 Churchill, R. R. and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3rd edition, Manchester, (Manchester University 
Press) 1999, pp. 24-25 
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continental shelf. This is a significant narrowing of the research topic in two ways. First, 
pipelines can be differentiated according to the functions they perform. Pipelines can be 
classified into inter- and intra-field pipelines as well as transmission pipelines.4 Transit 
pipelines are just one type of the latter, separate from landing pipelines, those that 
connect field with shore.5 The focus of the present thesis is solely transit pipelines in the 
definition given by Vinogradov as being  
an oil or gas transmission line that traverses maritime areas under the 
jurisdiction of one or several coastal States without being connected to any 
facility on the territory or subject to those coastal States jurisdiction.6  
An important aspect of transit pipelines is, thus, that they lie in multiple States’ 
jurisdiction, complicating their regulation. Second, the research area is narrowed down 
in a geographical sense. The focus is on the concurrently occurring zones of EEZ and 
continental shelf, as opposed to, on the one hand, the territorial sea and the archipelagic 
waters where the coastal State enjoys sovereignty, and on the other, the high seas and 
the Area, both beyond national jurisdiction. What makes the EEZ and the continental 
shelf, and the regulation of submarine pipelines in these geographical areas so 
interesting, is that the coastal State only enjoys sovereign rights in these zones as 
opposed to full sovereignty, while some of the freedoms of the other States are 
maintained. In order for both the coastal State and the other States to be able to enjoy 
their respective rights and freedoms and perform their duties, a careful balancing is 
required. This narrowing down, in the functional as well as the geographic sense, 
together provide for an exciting research topic as transit submarine pipelines in the 
coastal State’s EEZ and on its continental shelf is an area where many different interests 
compete and need balancing. 
 
The balancing between the coastal and the other States is in the core of the present 
thesis as the author asks how the LOS Convention manages to represent the interests of 
both the coastal State and the State laying the submarine pipeline through the former’s 
EEZ and continental shelf. To be able to answer this question, the author examines the 
interests of both State actors and their related rights and duties as provided for in the 
                                                 
4 Vinogradov, Sergei, ”Challenges of Nord Stream: Streamlining International Legal Frameworks and 
Regimes for Submarine Pipelines”, in German Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 52 (2009), pp. 251-
252 
5 Ibid. For further explanation on the pipeline categories see also Roggenkamp, Martha M., “Petroleum 
Pipelines in the North Sea: Questions of Jurisdiction and Practical Solutions”, in Journal of Energy & 
Natural Resources Law, Vol. 16:1 (1998), pp. 94-95, 100 and 106-107 
6 Vinogradov (2009), pp. 254 
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LOS Convention, especially in Article 79: “Submarine cables and pipelines on the 
continental shelf”. The sub-questions, that help answer the research question, relate to 
the said article and try to touch upon the practicalities of laying and maintaining 
submarine pipelines and protecting coastal State interests in the EEZ and on the 
continental shelf. The legal questions presented are: 
• What does the freedom to lay submarine pipelines entail? That is, are 
maintenance and access to the pipeline included? 
• Can the coastal State deny the right to lay pipelines by not allowing surveying? 
• What does the right to legislate for the purpose of exploration of continental 
shelf and exploiting its resources encompass? 
• What does the right to legislate for the purpose of prevention, reduction and 
control of pollution encompass? That is, are safety standards included? 
• Does the process of laying submarine pipelines represent pollution? 
The structure of the thesis follows these questions. The thesis is concluded with the 
summary of how balancing of these interests is established by the Convention. 
 
1.3 Historical context 
 
Before the substantive discussions, it is important to take a quick look at the historical 
background of submarine pipeline regulation.  
 
The international regulation of submarine pipelines does not have such a long history as 
its counterpart in legislation, the submarine cables. The first legal instrument that 
contains provisions on the issue is the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the High Seas7 and 
on the Continental Shelf8. These instruments, however, build on the International Law 
Commission’s draft articles that were heavily influenced by the earlier legislation on 
submarine cables, the 1884 Convention on the Protection of Submarine Cables.9 Thus, 
the Geneva Conventions extended the provisions on cables to pipelines too. 
Furthermore, the Geneva Conventions offered more protection to cables and pipelines 
than the 1884 Convention or the ILC drafts as the former included the obligation that 
the laying State shall pay due regard to existing pipelines and their repair, as well as the 
                                                 
7 1958 Convention on the High Seas, Geneva 
8 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, Geneva 
9 Nelson, L. Dolliver M, “Submarine Cables and Pipelines”, in Rene-Jean Dupuy and Daniel Vignes 
(eds.), A Handbook on the New Law of the Sea, Dordrecht, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) 1991, pp. 980 
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coastal State’s obligation that it may not impede their laying and maintenance.10 On the 
other hand, the coastal State’s legislative right was also extended by the Geneva 
Conventions for the exploration of its continental shelf and the exploitation of its 
resources.11 The Geneva Convention on the High Seas further contained an obligation 
that made it every State’s duty to legislate to prevent pollution from pipelines.12  
 
These provisions paved the way to those contained in the LOS Convention that, besides 
including articles on coastal State regulation of submarine pipelines in the territorial sea 
and archipelagic water, extended the rules in the EEZ and on the continental shelf. It 
expressly made all States entitled to lay submarine pipelines on the continental shelf and 
regulated the consent for the delineation of the course of pipelines, thus clearing up 
confusion around the possibility of whether a consent was required for the laying 
itself.13 While this favoured the laying State, the provision that the coastal State can take 
measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution from pipelines increased the power of 
the coastal State.14 This latter reflects the general spirit of the Convention aiming at 
protecting the marine environment. However, Article 24 of the Geneva Convention on 
the High Seas obliging every State to prevent pollution from pipelines was not repeated 
in the LOS Convention.  
 
1.4 Balance between coastal and maritime State’s interests in the LOS Convention  
 
With the establishment of the EEZ regime and the extension of the continental shelf, 
huge geographical areas came under coastal State jurisdiction. The changes introduced 
in the LOS Convention that extended the coastal State’s jurisdiction into areas 
previously considered part of the high seas, obviously affected the freedoms that all 
States, especially the big maritime nations, enjoyed in these areas. The consensus 
approach was used to make sure different interests were appropriately balanced.15  
 
                                                 
10 Ibid. pp. 981-983 
11 Ibid. pp. 981 
12 HSC Article 24 
13 Nelson (1991), pp. 984-985 
14 Ibid. pp. 985 
15 Rothwell, Donald R. and Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea, Oxford, (Hart Publishing) 
2010, pp. 13-14 
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Some elements of the high seas freedoms were preserved in the new or changed 
maritime zones, to achieve a consensus and thus make the new Convention acceptable 
to the maritime States. However, some of the high seas freedoms that concern the 
functional rights the coastal State enjoys in its EEZ had to be restricted to accommodate 
these rights and interests.16 These are the construction of artificial islands and 
installations, fishing and marine scientific research. It is essentially the freedom of 
navigation and overflight, as well as the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, 
that were extended to the EEZ. While these freedoms were preserved, it also had to be 
made sure that there is a balance with the rights and duties of the coastal State in this 
zone, as well as on the continental shelf.17 
 
This balancing in general is established through the main articles governing the rights 
and duties of both the coastal State and other States.18 Article 56 on the “Rights, 
jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive economic zone” and Article 
58 on the “Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone”, as their 
titles suggest, establish the backbone of the EEZ’s legal regime by providing for the 
coastal and other States’ rights and duties. Article 56 provides for the sovereign rights 
of the coastal State in relation to the natural resources of the EEZ and for coastal State 
jurisdiction in three issue areas: artificial island, installations and structures; marine 
scientific research; and protection and preservation of the marine environment. Article 
58, meanwhile, extends some of the high seas freedoms, as mentioned above, together 
with the provisions governing them.19 
 
With regard to the continental shelf, Article 77 on the “Rights of the coastal State over 
the continental shelf” and Article 78 on the “Legal status of the superjacent waters and 
air space and the rights and freedoms of other States” act similarly to Articles 56 and 58 
in establishing the core of the continental shelf regime.20 It is noteworthy that these 
articles establish rights for both coastal and other States, but not explicit duties. 
However, Article 77 establishes the coastal State’s sovereign rights “for the purpose of 
                                                 
16 Davenport, Tara, ”Submarine Communications Cables and Law of the Sea: Problems in Law and 
Practice”, in Ocean Development & International Law, Vol. 43:3 (2012), pp. 208 
17 Vinogradov (2009), pp. 280-281 
18 Vinogradov (2009), pp. 281 
19 LOSC Article 58 (2) refers to Articles 88-115 contained in the Part on the “High seas” 
20 Vinogradov (2009), pp. 281 
 6 
exploring [the continental shelf] and exploiting its natural resources”21. It is obvious 
that these sovereign rights of the coastal State have to be respected by all other States. 
There is, however, one limitation placed on the coastal State’s sovereign rights by 
Article 78. It provides protection to the freedoms of other States on the continental shelf 
from coastal State interference when exercising its sovereign rights. While, it seems that 
neither the coastal State nor the other States have many duties on the continental shelf, 
it has to be remembered that the continental shelf and the EEZ, in most cases, co-exist 
up till 200 nautical miles. Seawards of the EEZ’s limit, the EEZ’s regime is exchanged 
to that of the high seas. However, as Article 79, the main article regulating the laying of 
submarine pipelines, is found in Part VI on the “Continental Shelf”, it applies on the 
outer continental shelf as well. 
 
As the coastal State does not enjoy full sovereignty either in the EEZ or on the 
continental shelf, while other States enjoy specific rights in both, the Convention 
provides for the due regard obligation. Both the coastal State and the other States shall 
pay due regard to each other’s rights and duties. This is evident in Article 58 (3) 
providing for other States to have due regard to the coastal State’s rights and duties, as 
well as in its counterpart, the stipulation of Article 56 (2) that the coastal State is to pay 
due regard to other States when exercising its rights and duties. This is all the more 
important as some of the high seas freedoms are extended into the exclusive economic 
zone, among others the freedom of the laying of submarine pipelines, as provided for in 
Article 58 (1). In connection with these freedoms, Article 78 (2) repeats in the context 
of the continental shelf that the coastal State’s exercise of its rights is not to “infringe or 
result in any unjustifiable interference with navigation and other rights and freedoms of 
other States”22. The coastal State’s duty, therefore, to pay due regard to the other States’ 
rights and freedoms is guaranteed by the Convention in view of both the activities in the 
EEZ and those on the continental shelf. 
 
1.5 The perspectives of the coastal and the laying States 
 
The main objective of the State laying submarine pipelines in the EEZ or on the 
continental shelf of the coastal State is the assurance and continued exercise of its 
                                                 
21 LOSC Article 77 (1) 
22 LOSC Article 78 (2) 
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freedom. Since it is already a limited freedom as we shall see, the laying State’s interest 
dictates that the restrictions should be as defined as possible so as to leave little space 
for the coastal State to expand its jurisdiction and control. Furthermore, from the laying 
State’s point of view those areas that are not expressly regulated by the Convention 
should be left free of regulation. Such a view could lead to a very textual interpretation 
of the provisions that pose restrictions to the freedom to lay submarine pipelines.  
 
From the other perspective, that of the coastal State, an increased control over the 
activities of the laying State is desired. The coastal State has to make sure that its 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction in its EEZ and on its continental shelf are respected. 
From this perspective, it is expected that the coastal State wants to have at least an 
oversight over such activities that could have an impact on or in connection with the 
resources of these two zones. After all, only the coastal State has the right to explore 
and exploit these. Furthermore, the coastal State also has to think about its marine 
environment, not just because pollution affect its rights over natural resources, but also 
because of the environment’s intrinsic value. Therefore, it can be expected that the 
coastal State’s perspective would result in a broad interpretation of the provision giving 
rights to the coastal State over submarine pipelines in its maritime zones.  
 
These two perspectives have to be kept in mind during the discussion of the questions 
raised.  
 
1.6 Legal sources and method 
 
Although the present thesis is, first and foremost, concerned with the LOS Convention 
and how it achieves balance in the issue area of submarine pipelines, it is not the only 
legal source used during the discussions. 
 
The legal sources of international law in general, and that of the law of the sea in 
particular, can be derived from the Statute of the International Court of Justice23. Article 
38 lists as sources international conventions, custom, general principles of international 
law and judicial decisions and scholarly teachings.24 The core of the discussion centres 
                                                 
23 1945 Statute of the International Court of Justice, San Francisco 
24 ICJ Statute Article 38 (1) 
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on, as already mentioned, the LOS Convention. However, as the questions raised touch 
upon other areas of law, not just submarine pipelines, other sources are brought into the 
discussion as well. Among international conventions the author mainly utilises the 1992 
Convention on Biological Diversity (hereafter referred to as CBD)25 in connection with 
the protection of marine environment. Reference is made to general principles of 
international law in connection to environmental protection, especially to the 
precautionary principle and the preventive principle.26 In the same issue area, from 
among judicial decisions, the Southern Bluefin Tuna and the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
cases are briefly alluded to as subsidiary reference, while mention is taken to a wide 
array of legal writers.  
 
Interpretation of the legal texts is based on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties,27 Articles 31-32. First, a textual analysis is conducted in the discussion of each 
question, using the ordinary meaning of the words. This meaning is analysed in the 
context and in light of the object and purpose of the Convention.28 As part of the 
analysis based on the object and purpose, the principle of effectiveness has been also 
used to give the provisions the fullest effect that is consistent with the aims of the 
Convention.29  
 
As the context of the provisions analysed, reference is made to many other provisions of 
the LOS Convention as part of the convention text.30 Among these are, notably, Articles 
56 and 58 establishing the EEZ regime, and Articles 77 and 78 regulating the 
continental shelf regime. Recourse is also made to various provisions found in Part XII 
                                                 
25 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, Nairobi 
26 The limited space provided for a Master’s thesis is not sufficient to give a detailed account of said 
principles as the status, interpretation, application, and indeed the content, of these are widely debated. 
For in-depth analysis and discussion, see, among others, Birnie, Particia, Alan Boyle and Cathrine 
Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, 3rd edition, New York, US, (Oxford University Press) 
2009, pp. 137-164; Hey, Ellen, “The Precautionary Concept in Environmental Policy and Law: 
Institutionalizing Caution”, in The Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, Vol. 4:2 
(1992); Trouwborst, Arie, “The Precautionary Principle in General International Law: Combating the 
Babylonian Confusion”, in Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law, 
Vol. 16:2 (2007); Trouwborst, Arie, “Prevention, Precaution, Logic and Law: The Relationship between 
the Precautionary Principle and the Preventative Principle in International Law and Associated 
Questions”, in Erasmus Law Review, Vol. 2 (2009) 
27 1969 Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna 
28 Vienna Convention, Article 31 (1); Fitzmaurice, Malgosia, “The Practical Working of the Law of 
Treaties”, in Malcolm D. Evans (ed.), International Law, 2nd edition, Oxford, (Oxford University Press) 
2006, pp. 199, 202 
29 Fitzmaurice (2006), pp. 199, 202 
30 Vienna Convention Article 31 (2) 
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on the “Protection and preservation of the marine environment”. Besides, the above 
mentioned other legal sources also serve as means of interpretation as “relevant rules of 
international law applicable”31. As an aid of interpretation, Nordquist’s commentary32 
has also been utilised to highlight the circumstances of the negotiation and conclusion 
of some of the provisions.33  
                                                 
31 Vienna Convention Article 31 (3) (c)  
32 Nordquist, Myron H. (ed.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: A Commentary, 
Volume II, Dordrecht, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) 1993; Nordquist, Myron H. (ed.), United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: A Commentary, Volume IV, Dordrecht, (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers) 1991 





PART II – RIGHTS AND DUTIES RELATING TO SUBMARINE PIPELINES 
 
2.1 The structure of Article 79 “Submarine cables and pipelines on the continental 
shelf” 
 
While the rights and duties of coastal and other States in connection to submarine 
pipelines are laid down in different parts of the Convention depending on the maritime 
zone in question, the provisions this thesis focuses on are found in Article 79: 
“Submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf”. This Article is incorporated 
in Part VI: “Continental shelf”. However, due to the character of the continental shelf 
comprising of the seabed and the subsoil but not the water column above, the provisions 
of this Article have to be read in conjunction with those regulating the EEZ and the high 
seas. Both Article 58 and Article 87 on the “Freedom of the high seas” subject the 
freedom to lay submarine pipelines to the provisions of Article 79.34  
 
In the structure of Article 79, the first paragraph repeats the right of every State to lay 
submarine pipelines on other States’ continental shelf. This is followed by the 
limitations placed on this right as provided for by the next paragraphs. Paragraph 2, 
while providing that the coastal State may not impede the laying and maintenance of 
submarine pipelines, allows for the coastal State to regulate these pipelines. The coastal 
State has the right to take “reasonable measures” for three functions: “the exploration of 
the continental shelf, the exploitation of its natural resources and the prevention, 
reduction and control of pollution”35.  
 
The legislative rights the coastal State enjoys on the continental shelf are limited in 
relation to the functions the coastal State can exercise in this maritime zone. The areas 
of jurisdiction that Article 79 (2) grants to the coastal State are, therefore, related and 
                                                 
34 LOSC Article 58 subjects this freedom to the “relevant provisions of this Convention”, while Article 87 
refers to Part VI, respectively. The relevant provisions for the laying of submarine pipelines are contained 
in Article 79, since it is the continental shelf that lies under the water column of the EEZ and the high 
seas. Therefore, it is Article 79 that the freedom to lay submarine pipelines is subjected to 
35 LOSC Article 79 (2) 
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restricted to the functionally limited sovereign rights under Article 77 (1). Since Article 
77 gives the coastal State sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the continental 
shelf and exploiting its natural resources, the right to take measures for the prevention, 
reduction and control of pollution seems to be an exception. This case of coastal State 
jurisdiction, which was included in Article 79 relatively late compared to the other cases 
of coastal State jurisdiction already present in the 1958 Geneva Conventions, reflects 
the overall aim of the LOS Convention to protect and preserve the marine 
environment.36 Regulation for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution sets 
submarine pipelines apart from submarine cables as the Convention only provides for 
such regulation in the case of pipelines, but not in the case of cables. Moreover, 
paragraph 3 of Article 79 provides for a further restriction that only applies to pipelines 
but not cables. This paragraph subjects the delineation of the course of pipelines to the 
consent of the coastal State. According to Nordquist’s commentary on the LOS 
Convention, subjecting the course of the submarine pipelines to the consent of the 
coastal State is consistent with its right to take measures for the prevention, reduction 
and control of such pipelines as provided for by the previous paragraph.37 
 
Paragraph 4 deals with two issues relating to the sovereignty or the sovereign rights of 
the coastal State. Namely, Article 79 does not prejudice “the right of the coastal State to 
establish conditions for … pipelines entering its territory or territorial sea”38 and which, 
thus, fall under its full sovereignty. Furthermore, Article 79 provides that it does not 
affect the coastal State’s jurisdiction over pipelines “constructed or used in connection 
with the exploration of its continental shelf or exploitation of its resources or the 
operation of artificial islands, installations and structures under its jurisdiction”39. This 
is consistent with the sovereign rights of the coastal State “for the purpose of exploring 
[the continental shelf] and exploiting its natural resources”40, as provided for by Article 
77, as well as with the jurisdiction of the coastal State over artificial islands, 
installations and structures, as provided for in Articles 56 and 80 (with reference to 
Article 60). Article 79 (4), thus, leaves these two issues entirely under the coastal 
State’s authority.  
                                                 
36 LOSC Preamble, Paragraph 4 
37 Nordquist (1993), pp. 915 
38 LOSC Article 79 (4)  
39 Ibid. 
40 LOSC Article 77 (1) 
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Finally, paragraph 5 provides that other States, when laying new submarine pipelines, 
have to pay due regard to pre-existing ones (including cables), especially with a view to 
their maintenance. This limitation on the laying of pipelines is referred to by Article 112 
(2) regulating the laying of submarine pipelines on the high seas.  
 
The limitations on the freedom of laying submarine pipelines on the continental shelf 
stem mainly from the rights the coastal State enjoys both on the continental shelf and in 
the EEZ. The Convention gives the coastal State sovereign rights in its EEZ over natural 
resources. The limitations on the freedom of laying submarine pipelines due to these 
functional rights of the coastal State can be clearly seen in paragraph 2. Furthermore, 
Article 56 also gives the coastal State jurisdiction over, among others, the protection 
and preservation of the marine environment which is also reflected in paragraph 2 of 
Article 79. As mentioned above, Nordquist also attributes paragraph 3 of the same 
Article to the coastal State’s jurisdiction with regard to environmental protection. The 
coastal State’s jurisdiction over artificial islands, installations and structures, as well as 
its sovereign rights over the continental shelf for the purpose of exploring and 
exploiting its resources, as established in Article 77, are mirrored in the restrictions in 
paragraph 4 of Article 79. This paragraph is also a reflection of the coastal State’s 
sovereignty over its territorial sea. While Article 79 imposes restrictions on the laying 
of submarine pipelines as a way to make sure the coastal State can enjoy its rights in the 
EEZ and on the continental shelf, it is not just the coastal State’s rights the limitations 
can be attributed to. Also other State’s freedoms are protected by this Article. Thus, 
paragraph 5 balances other States’ freedom to lay and maintain submarine cables and 
pipelines with each other by providing for the protection of existing cables and pipelines 
by stipulating the duty to pay due regard to such cables and pipelines.  
 
While it is Article 79 that provides the main rules regarding submarine pipelines, 
Articles 112-115 in Part VII on the “High Seas” are also applicable to laying such 
pipelines in the EEZ. Article 58 (2) expressly stipulates this. These provisions, 
therefore, apply to the water column above the continental shelf whether it is the regime 
of the EEZ or the high seas that governs it. Article 112 repeats the freedom to lay 
submarine pipelines as well as contains a reference to Article 79 (5). The following 
Articles provide for flag State criminal and civil jurisdiction for breaking submarine 
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cables and pipelines, as well as for indemnification for incurred loss in the case of 
avoidance of such break by a vessel.  
 
The starting point of the regime governing transit submarine pipelines is, thus, the 
extension of the high seas freedom to lay such pipelines. This is of utmost importance 
for the laying State. However, this freedom is restricted to accommodate coastal State 
interests and the coastal State’s jurisdiction in different issue areas. Thus, the first task 
of this thesis has to be to examine the laying State’s freedom and what it encompasses. 
Only after that will the author examine the possible limitations posed by Article 79 that 
establish the coastal State’s jurisdiction.  
 
2.2 What does the freedom to lay submarine pipelines entail? 
 
The first question that arises is what exactly the freedom to lay submarine pipelines, 
enshrined in Article 79 (1), entails. More precisely, does the laying State enjoy the 
freedom to maintain such a pipeline? The problem is posed by the inconsistent language 
of Article 79, and also Article 87. Both Article 87 (1) (c)41 and Article 79 (1) provides 
for the freedom to lay submarine pipelines, while paragraph 2 of Article 79 stipulates 
that the laying and maintenance of such pipelines may not be impeded by the coastal 
State. The inconsistence of the Convention’s language warrants a closer look into 
whether and how maintenance is included into the freedom of all States.  
 
2.2.1 Maintenance as a freedom 
 
Article 79 (1) declares the entitlement of all States to lay submarine pipelines. While the 
right to maintain these pipelines is not included, importantly the following condition is 
added to the provision: “in accordance with the provisions of this article”42. While this 
condition, as already noted, imposes limitations on the freedom to lay pipelines, it also 
means that the importance of maintenance is included into the freedom. Significantly, 
paragraphs 2 and 5 include provisions on maintenance in relation to the laying of 
pipelines. As we have seen, both the laying and the maintenance of submarine pipelines 
                                                 
41 Since Article 87 (1) (c) subjects the freedom to lay submarine pipelines to Part VI, in particular Article 
79, the remainder of this discussion focuses solely on Article 79 
42 LOSC Article 79 (1) 
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are protected against impediment from the coastal State by paragraph 2. Paragraph 5 
places particular emphasis on the importance of maintenance by declaring that new 
cables and pipelines shall be laid so that the possibility of repairing old ones in not 
prejudiced. As Beckman notes, the right to maintain and repair submarine pipelines 
seems to be assumed under the right to lay them.43  
 
The same assumption could be drawn, furthermore, from Article 58 (1). That Article 
guarantees the freedom to lay submarine pipelines in the coastal State’s EEZ, along 
with the “other internationally lawful uses of the sea […] associated with the operation 
of”44 submarine pipelines. For the operation of submarine pipelines it is important that 
they are maintained properly and repaired if damaged. Such a use of the sea would also 
be compatible with the Convention as Article 79 shows in paragraphs 2 and 5.  
 
Thus, the right to maintain submarine pipelines is not just assumed under the right to lay 
them, but is also guarded by Article 79 from the coastal State’s interference as well as 
from the same right of other States to lay cables and pipelines. 
 
2.2.2 Does the laying State have a duty to maintain submarine pipelines? 
 
Having established that the right to lay submarine pipelines includes the right to 
maintain them as well, the question arises whether the right to lay pipelines entails with 
it a duty to maintain them, since the right to maintain in itself does not compel the 
laying State to do so. As Article 79 does not include a provision to this effect, the 
following discussion will centre on the text of the Convention as well as on 
environmental principles.  
 
2.2.2.1 Is there a duty to maintain pipelines in the LOS Convention? 
 
The point of departure in this case is that the maintenance of pipelines is essential in 
order to make sure that corrosion on the pipeline does not result in the pollution of the 
environment. While Article 79 (2) provides a basis for the coastal State’s right to 
                                                 
43 Beckman, Robert, Submarine Cables: A Critically Important but Neglected Area of the Law of the Sea, 
Indian Society of International Law, 7th International Conference on Legal Regimes of Sea, Air, Space 
and Antarctica, 15-17 January 2010, New Delhi, pp. 5-6 
44 LOSC Article 58 (1) 
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legislate for the purpose of the “prevention, reduction and control of pollution from 
pipelines”45 with which the laying State has to comply with, it has to be examined 
whether the Convention provides an obligation for the laying State in particular, to 
prevent such pollution. For this we have to turn to Part XII. 
 
While the general obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment applies to 
all States,46 Article 194 (1) and (2) are especially important among the general 
provisions of Part XII. These paragraphs provide for the obligation of all States to take 
measures “to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment”47 in 
general, and “not to cause damage by pollution to other States and their environment”48 
and the environment in areas beyond national jurisdiction from “activities under their 
jurisdiction or control”49. There is, thus, a general obligation to protect the marine 
environment in all maritime zones from activities under the jurisdiction and control of 
each State. While paragraph 1 mentions pollution to the marine environment itself, 
paragraph 2 emphasises the obligation not to cause transboundary harm. The latter is all 
the more important as the pipelines in question transit through another State’s EEZ and 
continental shelf. 
 
However, the articles of Part XII Section 5 that specifically provide for the prevention 
of pollution from difference sources do not include pollution from submarine pipelines. 
The only article that can be construed to include submarine pipelines only obliges the 
coastal State to take measures against such pollution.50 Furthermore, the article’s scope 
does not extend to transit pipelines. Article 208 establishes a direct link to Articles 60 
and 80, which give exclusive jurisdiction for the coastal State over artificial islands, 
installations and structures in its EEZ and on its continental shelf. Inter-field pipelines 
do belong under the scope of these provisions. The costal State’s jurisdiction over these 
is reinforced in Article 79 (4), along with submarine pipelines “constructed or used in 
connection with the exploration of [the coastal State’s] continental shelf or the 
exploitation of its resources”51. These pipelines also fall under the scope of Article 208 
                                                 
45 LOSC Article 79 (2) 
46 LOSC Article 192 
47 LOSC Article 194 (1) 
48 LOSC Article 194 (2) 
49 Ibid. 
50 LOSC Article 208 
51 LOSC Article 79 (4) 
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as “sea-bed activities subject to [the coastal State’s] jurisdiction”52. However, transit 
pipelines do not fall into either of the two categories included in Article 208. Therefore, 
it is only Article 194 in the LOS Convention that could provide a basis for a duty to 
maintain submarine pipelines.  
 
Article 194 (1) and (2) read together state that measures are to be taken to prevent 
pollution from activities that are under the jurisdiction or control of the State in 
question. However, while the Convention provides for the nationality of vessels, it does 
not provide for such in the case of submarine pipelines. As Roggenkamp suggests, the 
nationality of the pipelines can be derived from the nationality (State of incorporation or 
registration) of the owner company.53 As a basis for this assertion, Article 114 which 
regulates the breaking and injury of submarine pipelines talks about the owners of these 
pipelines.54 This means that the State whose national or company owns the pipeline - 
that is, the laying State - may “prescribe legislation for the conduct of this pipeline 
company outside its territory”55. If this is so, the laying State has jurisdiction over the 
pipeline and, thus, falls under the scope of the aforementioned article.  
 
Thus, in the present author’s view, the laying State is obliged not to cause damage by 
pollution from submarine pipelines to other States and their environment as the laying 
State does have jurisdiction and control over these pipelines. Does this mean, however, 
that the laying State have the duty to maintain such pipelines? For this, we have to turn 
to the preventive principle. 
 
2.2.2.2 Preventive principle 
 
In Article 194 (1) and (2) there is incorporated the preventive principle that requires 
States to prevent harm to the environment itself.56 The wording of Principle 2 of the 
1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development57 is reflective of these 
paragraphs as well in stating that  
                                                 
52 LOSC Article 208 (1) 
53 Roggenkamp (1998), pp. 97-98 
54 Ibid. 
55 Roggenkamp (1998), pp. 98 
56 Birnie et. al (2009), pp. 147 
57 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro 
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States have […] the responsibility to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction 
or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.58  
This principle also extends to the prevention in the face of risk of significant harm.59  
 
Thus, prevention means action before the environmental harm actually happens. What is 
more, this principle also contains a continuing obligation of prevention.60 This is where 
we can turn back to the maintenance of submarine pipelines. Preventing harm to the 
marine environment as a continuous obligation and as an obligation that requires action 
before the harm happens, requires that the pipelines shall be inspected regularly. 
Regular maintenance is needed to avoid even the risk of serious environmental harm.  
 
Without maintaining the pipelines, the laying State cannot comply with its duty to 
prevent pollution damage to the marine environment in general and the environment of 
the coastal State in particular. Therefore, the laying State does not only have a right to 
maintain the submarine pipelines, which presumably is in its best interest, but also has 
the duty to do so in order to protect the marine environment.  
 
2.2.3 Does the laying State have a freedom to access the pipeline? 
 
A related question to discuss is whether the laying State has the freedom to access the 
submarine pipeline in the coastal State’s EEZ and on its continental shelf. Such a right 
would be necessary to exercise in order for the laying State to maintain or repair the 
pipeline. However, such an access would also mean potentially extensive works on the 
seabed and subsoil, for example the examination of how well the course of the pipeline 
is buried in the ground.61  
 
                                                 
58 Rio Declaration, Principle 2 
59 Birnie et. al (2009), pp. 141-143 
60 Birnie et. al (2009), pp. 143; 1997 Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Hungary/Slovakia), Judgement, ICJ Reports, 1997, 7, Paragraph 140 
61 See Crowley, John, “International Law and Coastal State Control over the Laying of Submarine 
Pipelines on the Continental Shelf: The Ekofisk-Emden Gas Pipeline”, in Nordic Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 56 (1987), pp. 52. Among the problems with the Ekofisk-Emden Pipeline, Crowley cites the 
non-compliance with the Danish condition that the entire pipeline be buried to the depth of one metre, 
which was discovered as having resulted in divers being able to swim under the pipeline. Although this 
case is not strictly speaking about maintenance, but it highlights the need to re-examine the state of 
submarine pipelines 
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If right of access is a precondition of maintenance, then it seems inevitable that the right 
of access is governed by the same rules as the right to maintain, that is, by Article 58 
(1). Since the right of maintenance is categorised as another internationally lawful use 
of the sea as argued earlier, the right of access has to be included under the same label 
as well. At any rate, as the Convention, especially Article 56 (1), does not include rights 
for the coastal State over granting access to the EEZ, and indeed Article 58 (1) extends 
the high seas freedom of navigation to the EEZ, the coastal State has no right to restrict 
access for the vessels of the laying State. There are no such restrictions posed on the 
navigational rights of other States in the EEZ as in the case of the right of innocent 
passage in the territorial sea.62  
 
This right of access should not be offset by the coastal State’s sovereign rights to 
explore its continental shelf and exploit its resources as contained in Article 77. First, 
the right to access submarine pipelines for the purpose of repair and maintenance is not 
linked to the exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf. Therefore, the laying 
State’s right of access does not infringe on the sovereign rights of the coastal State on 
its continental shelf. Second, the Convention provides in Article 78 (2) that the coastal 
State in the exercise of its sovereign rights over its continental shelf shall not interfere 
with other States’ navigational and other rights and freedoms. There is no indication 
that other States’ freedom to lay submarine pipelines and rights related to this freedom 
were excluded from this provision. Refusing the right of access on the continental shelf 
would breach Article 78 (2).  
 
2.3 Can the coastal State deny the right to lay pipelines by not allowing surveying? 
 
Having established the elements of the freedom to lay submarine pipelines, it has to be 
examined whether the coastal State can have a restrictive effect on this freedom. Before 
the laying of pipelines, the laying State has to conduct surveys of the seabed to find the 
optimal routeing of the pipeline. If the coastal State has the power to refuse such a 
                                                 
62 In the territorial sea, the Convention gives right of innocent passage to other States. A vessel accessing 
the submarine pipeline with the purpose of maintenance in the territorial sea might find it difficult to 
compile with the requirement of innocent passage to be continuous and expeditious under Article 18 (2), 
as well as the requirement not to engage in an activity not having a direct bearing on passage under 
Article 19 (2) (l) 
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survey, it can effectively deny the laying State the exercise of its freedom to lay 
submarine pipelines.  
 
There is no consensus among legal writers what the activity of surveying the seabed for 
the purpose of finding an optimal route for submarine pipelines can be categorised as. It 
has been suggested that this activity qualifies as marine scientific research,63 but also 
that is it one of the “other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to [...] submarine 
cables and pipelines”64 in the sense of Article 58 (1) of the LOS Convention.65 There 
exists also a third option: that such an activity can be hydrographic surveying. It is 
debated whether hydrographic surveys constitute a separate category from marine 
scientific research. Whether or not this is the case will be discussed in detail later, as 
these imply different consequences for the laying of submarine pipelines. 
 
The following analysis focuses on these three options with the aim of establishing 
whether the coastal State can deny pipeline-related seabed surveying to the laying State 
thereby barring it from the freedom it may enjoy in the coastal State’s EEZ and on its 
continental shelf.  
 
2.3.1 What is marine scientific research and how is it regulated? 
 
The LOS Convention does not contain a definition for marine scientific research 
(MSR). Birnie defines MSR in its ordinary meaning as  
any form of scientific investigation, fundamental or applied, concerned with the 
marine environment, i.e. that has the marine environment as its object.66 
Importantly, the LOS Convention makes a distinction between fundamental and applied 
MSR, even if the Convention does not use these terms. Fundamental, or pure, research 
is carried out “in accordance with this Convention exclusively for peaceful purposes and 
in order to increase scientific knowledge of the marine environment for the benefit of all 
                                                 
63 Lott, Alexander, “Marine Environmental Protection and Transboundary Pipeline Projects: A Case 
Study of the Nord Stream Pipeline”, in Merkourios-Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, 
Vol. 27:73 (2011), pp. 59-61 
64 LOSC Article 58 (1) 
65 Vinogradov (2009), pp. 284 
66 Birnie, Patricia, “Law of the Sea and Ocean Resources: Implications for Marine Scientific Research”, 
in The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 10:2 (1995), pp. 242 
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mankind”67, while applied research is “of direct significance for the exploration and 
exploitation of natural resources”68. While such a distinction between fundamental and 
applied research was widely debated during the negotiations of the Convention,69 such a 
divide and the separate regulations seem to uphold the balance between researching 
States and coastal States.  
 
In the legal regime of the EEZ, the Convention’s Article 58 (1) (b) (ii) stipulates that the 
coastal State has jurisdiction with regard to MSR in its EEZ, in relation to which Article 
246 provides for a specific set of rules.70 While Article 246 (2) requires the coastal 
State’s consent to the conduct of MSR, such consent is expected by the Convention to 
be granted in “normal circumstances” under Article 246 (3).71 However, if the research 
project fulfils one of the criteria listed in Article 246 (5), the coastal State can withhold 
its consent. These criteria include, among others, the research being of applied nature, 
or involving drilling, “the use of explosives or the introduction of harmful substances 
into the marine environment”72.  
 
2.3.2 Are seabed surveys related to the laying of submarine pipelines marine scientific 
research? 
 
Classifying the surveying activities related to finding the optimal route for the 
submarine pipeline is difficult because of the lack of definitions of MSR or 
hydrographic surveying in the LOS Convention. It seems, however, certain that such 
pipeline-related seabed surveying is not fundamental, or pure, research as it is not solely 
intended for the benefit of all mankind. It is related to commercial activity. Is it, then, 
applied research? According to Soons’s broad definition, applied research is 
                                                 
67 LOSC Article 246 (3); see also Churchill & Lowe (1999), pp. 405-406 
68 LOSC Article 246 (5) (a); see also Churchill & Lowe (1999), pp. 405 
69 De Marffy, Annick, “Marine Scientific Research”, in Rene-Jean Dupuy and Daniel Vignes (eds.), A 
Handbook on the New Law of the Sea, Dordrecht, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) 1991, pp. 1128-1131, 
1133 
70 Lott (2011), pp. 59 
71 This is the case even if there are no diplomatic relations between the researching State and the coastal 
State, as a consequence of Art. 246 (4). This would mean that, if surveying the seabed for the purpose of 
finding an optimal routeing for the submarine pipeline to be laid is considered MSR, the laying State 
enjoys the same conditions for such surveys whether it has established diplomatic relations with the 
coastal State or not. Thus, its freedom to lay submarine pipelines cannot be denied through a refusal of 
MSR solely because there are no diplomatic relations between the two States 
72 LOSC Article 246 (5) (b) 
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“undertaken primarily for specific practical purposes”73. Thus, the surveying to find 
optimal routeing for submarine pipelines, by being for commercial purposes, would 
qualify as applied research and, therefore, is encompassed in the scope of Article 246.74 
 
However, there does not seem to be a basis for such a definition in the Convention. 
Therefore, the present author supports the definition put forward by Churchill and Lowe 
that is based on the text of Article 246 (5): 
Applied research is that which is of ‘direct significance for the exploration and 
exploitation of natural resources’. Such research clearly impinges directly upon 
the interests of the coastal State in exercising its sovereign rights over its natural 
resources. The same is true of research which is particularly intrusive upon the 
coastal State’s maritime zones.75  
 
Surveying the seabed for a pipeline’s route does not seem to fit in any of these 
categories, and seems to sit in between fundamental and applied research. While it is not 
“pure” research since it has a commercial purpose, it does not have a direct significance 
regarding the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources under the coastal 
State’s jurisdiction either. What might be intrusive upon the coastal State’s EEZ is listed 
among the criteria in Article 246 (5), that is, drilling, use of explosives or harmful 
substances or construction of artificial islands, installations and structures. The 
researching of samples and seabed topography does not seem to require either of these 
and this was not the case in Lott’s example of the Estonian-Russian incident of 2007 
either.76  
 
If it is supposed that such surveying in connection with submarine pipelines does fall 
under a broader definition of MSR, the coastal State would be expected to give its 
consent to the conduct of such surveying. Would this surveying include drilling, use of 
explosives, the introduction of harmful substances into the environment or the 
construction of installations, the coastal State has the possibility to withhold its 
consent.77 However, as noted, the present author is of the view that topographical 
surveying does not involve any of these activities.  
                                                 
73 Lott (2011), pp. 59 
74 Ibid. 
75 Churchill & Lowe (1999), pp.405 
76 Lott (2011), pp. 61 
77 LOSC Article 246 (5) 
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2.3.3 What is hydrographic surveying? 
 
If not MSR, then the question may arise whether surveying for the purpose of finding an 
optimal pipeline routeing can be classified as hydrographic surveying.  
 
Even though the LOS Convention draws a distinction between MSR and hydrograhic 
surveys in three Articles, namely Articles 19 (2) (j), 21 (1) (g) and 40, it again does not 
provide a definition for hydrographic surveys. This is more understandable as the 
Convention does not denote a whole part to such activity unlike MSR. The International 
Hydrographic Organization (IHO) provides the following definition: 
Hydrography is the branch of applied sciences which deals with the measurement 
and description of the physical features of oceans, seas, coastal areas, lakes and 
rivers, as well as with the prediction of their change over time, for the primary 
purpose of safety of navigation and in support of all other marine activities, 
including economic development, security and defence, scientific research, and 
environmental protection.78  
This definition places hydrography somewhat separate from scientific research as it is 
clear from its purpose as providing support to scientific research. Distinction between 
hydrographic surveying and MSR, as already mentioned, seems to be implied by the 
LOS Convention as well. As Rothwell and Stephens mention, some States have based 
claims on this distinction.79 In light of the consistent language use of the Convention, it 
would indeed be rather strange if the distinction made between MSR and hydrographic 
surveys by the text would be purely incidental.  
 
There have, however, been opposite arguments. Rothwell and Stephens cite China’s 
position that MSR and hydrographic surveying are essentially the same with the 
difference that hydrographic surveying serves “different purposes from either pure or 
applied research”80. Furthermore, Bateman argues that because hydrographic surveys 
have economic value or utility now or in the future, they should be treated as MSR.81 
 
                                                 
78 Definition of Hydrography. International Hydrographic Organization. 
http://www.iho.int/srv1/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=299&Itemid=289 [Visited 11 
July 2013] 
79 Rothwell & Stephens (2010), pp. 330 
80 Ibid. 
81 Bateman, Sam, “Hydrographic surveying in the EEZ: differences and overlaps with marine scientific 
research”, in Marine Policy, Vol. 29:2 (2005), pp. 170-172 
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In the first case that hydrographic surveys are separate from MSR, the consequence 
would be that conducting hydrographic surveys in the EEZ or on the continental shelf of 
the coastal State is a freedom, “free from coastal State regulation”82. This is because the 
Convention does not regulate hydrographic surveys apart from the said Articles which 
relate to activities in the territorial sea, international straits and the archipelagic 
waters.83 If, however, the case is that hydrographic surveys are part of MSR, the 
regulations contained in Article 246 would apply to hydrographic surveys as well, 
including the requirement for the coastal State’s consent. In this case too, however, such 
consent should be granted in normal circumstances, especially if the criteria in Article 
246 (5) are not met.  
 
While there is doubt as to whether hydrographic surveys can be considered part of MSR 
or not, the present author takes the view that hydrographic surveys are separate from 
MSR. One reason for this is that the wording of the Convention is applied consistently 
throughout the whole text. This has been highlighted by the example that during the 
drafting of the Convention’s text, Article 79 (2)’s wording has been adjusted from 
“prevention of pollution from pipelines” to “prevention, reduction and control of 
pollution from pipelines” to suit the rest of the text.84 Furthermore, such an 
understanding would be consistent with the decreasing coastal State power the further 
away from the coast the maritime zone in question is. Thus, while the coastal State can 
regulate in respect of marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys in the 
territorial sea, in the EEZ it is only entitled to jurisdiction with regard to marine 
scientific research. This would be in line with the more essential nature of hydrographic 
surveys. They are, as the Chinese argument85 and the definition of the IHO86 have also 
acknowledged, of different purpose than MSR: they are concerned with safety. 
Therefore, it is important that such hydrographic surveys could be conducted freely in 




                                                 
82 Rothwell & Stephens (2010), pp.330 
83 Article 40 applies mutatis mutandis in the archipelagic waters under Article 54 
84 Nordquist (1993), pp. 915 
85 Rothwell & Stephens (2010), pp. 330-331 
86 Definition of Hydrography [2013] 
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2.3.4 Can surveying related to pipelines be considered hydrographic surveying? 
 
As already mentioned, seabed surveying for the purpose of finding the optimal route for 
submarine pipelines seems to sit between the categories of pure research and research 
applied to exploration and exploitation of natural resources. It has an economic or 
commercial character in that it is essential for the transportation of oil and gas but at the 
same time such surveying is also related to safety. While hydrographic surveying is 
often associated with safety of navigation, the IHO definition links it with other 
maritime activities such as environmental protection and economic activity. This wide 
definition renders hydrographic surveys as a suitable category for pipeline-related 
seabed surveying in the present authors view. 
 
Surveying the seabed for future laying of pipelines is, on the one hand, about safety. 
Not the safety of navigation necessarily but of the marine environment and of economic 
development. Without such surveys the submarine pipeline could be laid on unsuitable 
grounds that could lead to its breakage and leaking of its contents that may harm both 
the marine environment and potentially economic interests and safety of supply. On the 
other hand, it also supports economic activity: without such surveying it would not be 
possible to lay submarine pipelines.  
 
2.3.5 What are the consequences of pipeline-related seabed surveying being categorised 
as hydrographic surveying? 
 
Since hydrographic surveying, separate from MSR, is not regulated in the EEZ or on the 
continental shelf by the Convention, it seems that States are free to conduct such 
activities in these maritime zones. Such a conclusion can be drawn from Articles 87 (1) 
and 58 (1) where the phrases “inter alia”87 and “other internationally lawful uses of the 
sea”88 respectively can be construed as to refer to, among other, hydrographic 
surveying.89  
 
                                                 
87 LOSC Article 87 (1), original emphasis 
88 LOSC Article 58 (1) 
89 Bateman (2005), pp. 165 
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Especially Article 58 (1) is of importance for the present thesis, as it provides for all 
States, in the EEZ of another, to enjoy the high seas freedom of, among others, the 
laying of submarine cables and pipelines  
[…] and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, 
such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine 
cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this 
Convention.90  
Surveying the seabed for the optimal pipeline routeing is, without doubt, associated 
with submarine pipelines. The freedom to conduct pipeline-related seabed surveys, then, 
is contrasted with MSR to which the coastal State’s jurisdiction is established by Article 
56 (1) (b) (ii).  
 
Furthermore, the conclusion that the laying State is free to conduct such surveying 
without the need to ask for prior coastal State consent is in line with the spirit of Article 
79. Said Article provides that “all States are entitled to lay submarine […] pipelines on 
the continental shelf, in accordance with the provisions of this article”91. That Article, 
however, does not include any reference to coastal State consent relating to the 
surveying of the seabed. The only consent it requires is that for the delineation of the 
course of the pipeline, and the commentaries on the Convention’s negotiations do not 
contain any reference to requiring consent for pipeline-related surveying.92  
 
What is important is that Article 79 states the freedom of all States to lay submarine 
pipelines. As Vinogradov notes, such pipelines cannot be built without prior 
examination of the seabed:93 “[w]ithout such survey, the freedom to lay submarine 




                                                 
90 LOSC Article 58 (1) 
91 LOSC Article 79 (1) 
92 Since in practice it can be difficult to determine whether a vessel engages in hydrographic survying or 
exploration, a solution to the problem could be a system of notifications, making identification and 
inspection easier for the coastal State. Requiring notification from such vessels could be included as a 
reasonable measure for the exploration of the continental shelf under Article 79 (2), creating a middle 
ground for both the coastal and the laying State to agree on 
93 Vinogradov (2009), pp. 284 
94 Ibid. 
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2.4 What does the right to legislate for the purpose of exploration of continental shelf 
and exploiting its resources encompass? 
 
Having established the freedom of all States to lay, maintain and access submarine 
pipelines and that the coastal State shall not deny this freedom by banning the laying 
State from conducting hydrographic surveys, we can turn to the restrictions imposed on 
the laying State’s freedom by Article 79. The first restriction placed by Article 79 (2) on 
the freedom to lay submarine pipelines is in connection with the exploration of the 
continental shelf and the exploitation of its resources. The coastal State is given the 
right “to take reasonable measures”95 for this purpose. While the wording of this article 
does not seem particularly contentious, as this legislative right of the coastal State 
relates to its sovereign rights enshrined in Article 77 (1) it warrants a closer look.  
 
2.4.1 Can the coastal State close off part of its continental shelf with the view of future 
exploitation? 
 
The purpose of the provision in Article 79 (2) that allows the coastal State to take 
measures for the exploitation of the continental shelf’s resources seems to be to ensure 
that the coastal State can exercise its sovereign rights on the continental shelf. 
Therefore, it is no surprise that this provision has been included in the law of the sea 
since the 1958 Geneva Conventions. These sovereign rights include all the necessary 
rights that are connected to the exploitation of the resources of the continental shelf.96 It 
can be said, therefore, that the sovereign rights of the coastal State are very extensive. 
Considering its purpose to ensure the exercise of the coastal State’s rights, the question 
is whether Article 79 (2) can serve to ensure also the future exercise of the coastal 
State’s sovereign rights. Phrased in a different way, can the coastal State “reserve” areas 
of the continental shelf for future exploitation on the basis of this provision, thus 





                                                 
95 LOSC Article 79 (2) 
96 Churchill & Lowe (1999), pp. 151 
 27 
2.4.1.1 Object of Article 79 (2), read together with Articles 77 and 78 
 
Article 79 (2) intends to strike a balance between the sovereign rights of the coastal 
State and the freedom of the laying State. It brings together Article 77 ensuring the 
exercise of coastal State sovereign rights as well as Article 78 (2) that guards the 
freedom of, among other, the laying of submarine pipelines. This balancing means that 
Article 79 (2) tries to protect the interests of both sides. 
 
Coastal State jurisdiction is, thus, restricted so that it cannot take any measures, but 
“reasonable” ones. While reasonableness does not have a clear definition or test,97 the 
coastal State cannot effectively ban the laying of submarine pipelines. However, the 
coastal State does have extensive rights for the exploitation of the continental shelf’s 
resources. This is coupled with Article 77 that does not include a time limit on the 
coastal State’s sovereign rights. The coastal State is not obliged to exploit its resources 
at all, and there seems to be nothing stopping it from postponing exploitation to the 
future. The coastal State’s duty not to impede the laying and maintenance of submarine 
pipelines in Article 79 (2) is subject to its legislative right connected to its sovereign 
rights. 
 
2.4.1.2 Restricting an area on the basis of Article 79 (3)  
 
It is Article 79 (3) that stipulates that the coastal State’s consent is needed for the 
delineation of the course of submarine pipelines. This is the provision the coastal State 
can turn to, together with paragraph 2 of the same article, if it wants to restrict an area 
from submarine pipelines. However, as it will be explained later in section 2.6.4, there 
is possibly the obligation that the coastal State shall provide an alternative routing for 
the pipeline as paragraph 3 does not include the need to ask the consent of the coastal 
State to the laying itself.  
 
Thus, the coastal State cannot close off the whole of its continental shelf to preserve it 
for future exploitation. However, it is possible for the coastal State not to give its 
consent to the routeing of a planned pipeline on the basis of its sovereign rights. This is 
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not excluded by the provision. It could be within the rights of the coastal State 
connected to its resource-related sovereign rights to close off an area with the view of 
future resource exploitation. 
 
2.5 What does the right to legislate for the purpose of prevention, reduction and control 
of pollution encompass? 
 
Now, we can turn to the more contentious issues presented by Article 79 (2). The focus 
in the following sections will be on the coastal State’s right to legislate for “the 
prevention, reduction and control of pollution”98. This provision is all the more 
interesting as it is not related to the sovereign rights of the coastal State but more to its 
jurisdiction with regard to the protection and preservation of the marine environment as 
provided for by Article 56 (1) (b) (iii). This is also a reflection of the Conventions 
general aim of protecting the marine environment.99  
 
A contentious issue in connection with this provision is how to interpret “reasonable 
measures for […] the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from pipelines”100 
and what such a legislation could encompass. As explained above, paragraph 2 of 
Article 79 grants limited legislative rights to the coastal State which are related to the 
functional rights the coastal State enjoys in its EEZ and on the continental shelf, as well 
as to its jurisdiction for the purpose of environment protection. Due to the limited nature 
of the coastal State legislative jurisdiction over submarine pipelines transiting its 
continental shelf, the question arises: what is encompassed in the coastal State’s 
legislative power for the purpose of pollution prevention? More precisely, can the 
coastal State impose safety standards as reasonable measures, over such pipelines in the 
name of preventing pollution from breakage due to, for example, anchorage or 
grounding? Such safety measures could include, for instance, safety zones around 
pipelines that would restrict anchoring or the possibility of laying new pipelines; or the 
burial of the submarine pipeline into the subsoil. Such measures could affect the laying 
State negatively: safety zones could limit the laying State’s right to lay submarine 
                                                 
98 LOSC Article 79 (2) 
99 LOSC, Preamble, Paragraph 4 
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pipelines by protecting existing ones, while the requirement of burial can increase the 
cost of laying and maintaining submarine pipelines. 
 
The wording of Article 79 (2) clearly states that the coastal State’s legislative power has 
to be exercised for the purpose of “prevention, reduction and control of pollution from 
pipelines”. The interpretation of this provision has to look at the meaning of the words 
used by the lawmakers, for which the definition of “pollution” has to be examined.  
 
2.5.1 Meaning of pollution and its regulation 
 
A definition of “pollution of the marine environment” is included into the Convention, 
in Article 1 (1) (4), where pollution is understood as meaning  
the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the 
marine environment […] which results or is likely to result in such deleterious 
effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to human health, 
hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the 
sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities.101 
As several commentators have pointed out, this definition of “pollution of the marine 
environment” is significant because it is open to include all the sources and types of 
pollution,102 thus giving a dynamic and evolutionary character to the term.103 Thanks to 
this open and evolutionary character of the term “pollution”, new pollution sources 
could be included into the interpretation of the definition, along with new rules and 
standards to mitigate these. Thus, areas with an environmental dimension include the 
areas of, for example, ships collision104 and noise pollution105. Alongside the dynamic 
terminology employed by the LOS Convention, another tool used to achieve dynamism 
in the Convention is the allusions to the other international instruments by the 
employment of rules of reference to generally accepted international rules and 
standards.106 On the one hand, this allows the incorporation of new standards into the 
framework of the Convention in line with the newer scientific and technological 
discoveries, to keep the Convention up-to-date. This is especially important in the area 
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of marine environment protection. On the other hand, through rules of reference such 
rules and standards become obligatory to which otherwise a State have not consented. 
This leads to a greater global uniformity in the law of the sea, and in particular in 
marine environment protection. 
 
Especially with the prevention of accidental pollution from ships collision is it possible 
to draw parallels when it comes to safety measures in the case of submarine pipelines, 
as pollution may originate from a breakage of such a pipeline caused by the grounding 
of a vessel or anchorage. Similarly to ships collision, in the case of a pipeline breakage 
caused by grounding, anchorage or bottom trawling, the result of the accident is the 
leakage of a substance, for example oil or gas. This can be understood as an indirect 
way of introducing these substances into the marine environment “by man”107. Such a 
leakage can cause harm to marine life and consequently affect marine activities. The 
definition of pollution in the LOS Convention, thus, can easily be stretched wide 
enough to include leakage resulting from pipeline breakage caused by, for example, 
grounding or anchorage. 
 
2.5.2 Purpose and object of Article 79 (2) 
 
Even if pollution from the breakage of submarine pipelines can be included into the 
pollution definition of the Convention, safety measures are not in themselves directed at 
the prevention of such pollution. While they do have the side effect of preventing 
pollution, safety measures are, first and foremost, aimed at preventing the accidents 
themselves. In the author’s view, there is a distinction between measures taken 
specifically to prevent pollution of the marine environment and measures taken to avoid 
collisions or accidents. Therefore, further analysis is required to answer the question 
whether safety standards are covered by the rights given to the coastal State in Article 
79 (2).  
 
However, a further parallel can be drawn between accidental vessel-source pollution 
and pollution from submarine pipeline breakage. In the case of accidental vessel-source 
pollution, Article 211 (1) of the LOS Convention, in Part XII, makes a direct linkage 
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between international rules and standards for the purpose of avoiding accidents, 
specifically mentioning ships routeing measures, and the pollution of the marine 
environment such an accident could cause. This reference incorporates into the LOS 
Convention various IMO instruments, among others the 1972 Convention on the 
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG) and the 1974 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). Measures, such as 
ships’ routeing systems108 or Areas to be avoided109 and No anchoring areas110, not only 
aim at maritime safety but also result, in an indirect way, in the prevention of accidental 
pollution. Similar safety measures if imposed by the coastal State in the case of 
submarine transit pipelines can also lead to improved safety from grounding or 
anchorage, as, for example, no anchoring areas or safety zones would restrict vessels’ 
movement and anchorage in the vicinity of submarine pipelines 
 
The purpose of Article 79 (2) when providing for the legislative jurisdiction of the 
coastal State, in this case, is to provide protection for the marine environment in the 
EEZ of the coastal State as well as in the adjacent areas from pollution from pipelines. 
On the one hand, this is an end in itself as witnessed by the Preamble of the Convention. 
On the other hand, in order for the coastal State to enjoy its rights over the living natural 
resources of its EEZ, these resources and their environment have to be protected against 
pollution, in this case, from leakage of submarine pipelines. Article 79 (2), thus, aims at 
giving the necessary tools for the coastal State to protect the marine environment in its 
EEZ and on its continental shelf. 
 
If, as shown above, the breakage of such pipelines is understood as pollution of the 
marine environment, the prevention of such an accident is well served by safety 
measures similar to those aimed at preventing ships collision. While safety measures are 
not directly aimed at the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from pipelines, 
they do have the effect of preventing such pollution. Therefore, the coastal State’s right 
to legislate against pollution under Article 79 (2) can be construed to include safety 
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measures that are reasonably protecting the course of the transiting submarine pipelines. 
Such an interpretation is confirmed by, among others, Klumbyte111 and Roggenkamp112.  
 
An opposite argument could be based on a very narrow reading of Article 79 (2) and a 
narrow understanding of reasonable measures taken to prevent, reduce and control 
pollution. However, in the author’s view, such an interpretation would be against the 
spirit of the Convention. Excluding safety measures from the scope of the said 
paragraph would mean that the coastal State is denied a way to prevent pollution from 
accidents concerning submarine pipelines. 
 
2.6 Does the process of laying submarine pipelines represent pollution? 
 
A further, and possibly even more controversial, issue concerns two interlinked 
questions, namely: at what point does the pollution for which the coastal State is given 
legislative jurisdiction by Article 79 (2) occur, and how broadly can the “pollution from 
pipelines” be understood. As Proelss points out, a major environmental issue in 
connection with submarine pipelines arises at the time such pipelines are being laid, not 
necessarily during the lifetime of the pipelines, as the process of the laying of pipelines 
disturbs the seabed and along with that the benthic habitats.113 Therefore, it is important 
to assess whether the coastal State is allowed to legislate to protect the marine 
environment, especially habitats and biodiversity, in the case of the laying of the 
submarine pipelines, as opposed to the existence of the pipelines; or indeed, it might 
have the duty to do so.  
 
As a first step, the text and the wording of the provision laid down in Article 79 (2) has 
to be looked at. That paragraph stipulates that such a legislative right of the coastal State 
exists with regard to pollution from pipelines. The text seems to suggest that the coastal 
State is only entitled to legislate in the case of already existing pipelines, not pipelines 
that are in the process of being laid. Such an interpretation is reinforced by the wording 
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of the rest of the same paragraph that emphasises the difference between new and 
existing pipelines by mentioning the “laying and maintenance of such […] pipelines”114. 
On this basis, it would reasonably be expected that, had the lawmakers intended to give 
a legislative power to the coastal State for the purpose of pollution caused during the 
laying of the submarine pipelines, they would have expressly made a reference to that. 
 
As explained above, the structure of Article 79 composes of the freedom of laying 
submarine cables and pipelines and the limitations placed on this freedom as a result of 
it taking place on the continental shelf of another State. The purpose of the whole 
Article, and within it that of paragraph 2, is to provide for a balance between the coastal 
State’s resource related interests and its interest to protect its marine environment, and 
the freedom of all States to lay and maintain submarine pipelines. The article makes 
sure that both of these interests can be fulfilled without placing unnecessarily onerous 
restrictions on either group of States. If the coastal State’s legislative jurisdiction 
extended to the case of the laying of the submarine pipelines for the protection of 
habitats, that might mean an unreasonable interference into the freedom of laying 
submarine pipelines. 
 
2.6.1 Is the process of laying submarine pipelines considered pollution in the sense of 
Article 1 (1) (4)? 
 
While the text of Article 79 (2) seems to indicate that the coastal State’s right to take 
measures for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution only include pollution 
for already existing pipelines, the definition of pollution as provided for in the LOS 
Convention’s Article 1 (1) (4) has to be scrutinised again. While the laying of 
submarine pipelines can cause harm to marine life by disturbing benthic habitats, the 
already cited definition in the LOS Convention is clear in stipulating that pollution is a 
“substances or energy”115. Although as mentioned earlier, the definition of pollution in 
the law of the sea has been evolving as a response to new concerns, it is questionable 
whether “the introduction […] of substances or energy”116 can be stretched so widely as 
to include the laying of submarine pipelines. If the laying of submarine pipelines cannot 
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be categorised as substances or energy, then there is no place to consider whether it 
causes harm to marine life or not.117  
 
If the process of laying submarine pipelines cannot be understood in conformity with 
the definition of pollution as contained in the LOS Convention, the coastal State’s 
jurisdiction over submarine pipelines for the purpose of prevention, reduction and 
control of pollution under Article 79 (2) cannot be extended to that activity. The coastal 
State’s jurisdiction is only “activated” by the conditions of Article 79 (2) once the 
pipeline is already laid. The subject of this jurisdiction is the pollution that originates 
from the pipeline, not the environmental effects of the laying of such pipelines. Thus, 
the process of laying submarine pipelines cannot be included into the pollution 
definition provided by the Convention.  
 
2.6.2 If not pollution, then how can the process of laying submarine pipelines be 
categorised and how is it governed by the Convention? 
 
The case of loss of benthic habitats from the laying of submarine pipelines could rather 
be likened to the adverse effects caused by ballast water exchange. Ballast water 
exchange and the introduction of invasive alien species as its result have been described 
as “threat to biodiversity”, rather than pollution.118 The basis for this is, first, that the 
living organisms introduced by ballast water into the marine environment cannot be 
categorised as substances or energy in the meaning of Article 1 (1) (4) of the LOS 
Convention. Secondly, Article 196 (1) that contains the obligation to protect the marine 
environment from alien species makes a distinction between pollution and the 
introduction of such species. This distinction is confirmed by Nordquist’s commentary 
on the said Article, explaining that even though looking at the text of Article 196 (1) 
would suggest that the introduction of alien species is part of the concept of pollution, 
the history of the Article’s development shows that these are two distinct issues.119 The 
placing of Article 196 further reinforces that it is not to be considered pollution, as it is 
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placed among the general obligations relating to the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment in Part XII, and not in the section on pollution prevention.120 
 
The threat posed to the marine environment by the shifting of sediments at the time of 
the laying of submarine pipelines can be considered as a threat to marine biodiversity 
due to it disturbing the benthic habitat. Similarly to ballast water exchange, the result of 
the process of laying submarine pipelines is not an introduction of substance or energy 
into the marine environment but it is nonetheless a harm to marine life in its effect. 
Furthermore, the only reference to the protection of habitats is to be found among the 
general provisions of Part XII, not among the provisions relating to pollution.  
 
The general obligation relating to the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment is contained in Article 192. It has been argued that Part XII of the LOS 
Convention should be read broadly as to include not just the prevention of pollution in 
the sense of Article 1 (1) (4) but also conservation of marine life.121 It is in Article 194 
(5) where the LOS Convention, concluded years before the concerns for biological 
diversity arose, contains, in Part XII, the only clear conservation obligation, relating to 
the protection of habitats: 
The measures taken in accordance with this Part shall include those necessary to 
protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, 
threatened or endangered species and other forms of marine life.122 
This seems to allow for the coastal State to legislate for environment protection and 
conservation, at least when it comes to vulnerable ecosystems and habitats.  
 
However, Article 194 (5) is only applicable in the case of “measures taken in 
accordance with this Part”, that is, Part XII on the “Protection and preservation of the 
marine environment”. Even though the said Part contains obligations for the coastal 
State to legislate for the purpose of prevention, reduction and control of pollution from 
seabed activities and artificial islands, installations and structures under its jurisdiction 
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in Article 208, this Article, as previously mentioned, is not applicable to submarine 
pipelines that are transiting the coastal State’s continental shelf.  
 
Furthermore, paragraph 1 of Article 194 stipulates that the measures taken by the States 
to protect the marine environment shall be consistent with the Convention.123 This 
would suppose that, in the case of submarine pipelines, the freedom to lay such 
pipelines should not be infringed as that would lead to a bad precedent for the other 
freedoms of the high seas to which all States have the right, recognised by this 
Convention, to exercise.  
 
2.6.3 Obligations to protect the marine environment under international law 
 
The LOS Convention establishes its relationship with other international instruments in 
Article 311, giving it priority over other treaties requiring other treaties to be compatible 
with it.124  
 
The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity contains, among others, in Article 8 (d) a 
provision obliging the Contracting Parties to 
as far as possible and as appropriate […] promote the protection of ecosystems, 
natural habitats and the maintenance of viable populations of species in natural 
surroundings.125 
This obligation seems consistent not just with the general objectives of the LOS 
Convention to conserve the living resources of the seas and protect and preserve the 
marine environment,126 but also specifically with Article 194 (5) of the LOS 
Convention cited above.  
 
However, Article 22 (2) of the CBD requires the implementation of its provisions to be 
consistent “with the rights and obligations of States under the law of the sea”127. This 
reinforces the priority of the LOS Convention (except for in cases of serious damage or 
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threat)128 over the CBD.129 From the requirement of consistency with the LOS 
Convention it flows that the freedoms of the high seas cannot be ignored when 
implementing the CBD.130 Boyle cites the specific example of the freedom of 
navigation vessels enjoy on the high seas as well as in the EEZ131 but this example can 
be extended to the laying of submarine pipelines as this activity is encompassed among 
the freedoms of the high seas.  
 
Article 237 of the LOS Convention acts as a lex specialis in the case of Part XII of the 
Convention and other conventions on the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment.132 Under this provision, agreements concluded for that purpose do not 
have to be compatible with the LOS Convention but only be consistent with it. As 
Jakobsen argues, as a result of the conclusion of the CBD, the general obligation set 
down in Article 192 of the LOS Convention can be considered to encompass the duty to 
preserve and conserve the biological diversity.133 If that is so, the obligation towards 
marine biodiversity would be applicable in the case of laying submarine pipelines, as 
Article 192 is a very general obligation, without reference to other sections of Part XII 
that was problematic in the case of Article 194 (5). 
 
The priority of the agreements in Article 237 is stipulated if they are “concluded in the 
furtherance of the general principles set forth in this Convention”134. These general 
principles can be argued to include both environmental obligations and navigational and 
other freedoms,135 which again does not seem to support the coastal State’s right to 
legislate for the protection of biodiversity over the laying of submarine pipelines. 
 
What seems to support a possibility for the coastal State to protect marine biodiversity 
from the laying of transiting submarine pipelines is if it is possible to show that the 
exercise of the right to lay submarine pipelines causes “a serious damage or threat to 
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biological diversity”136. However, it might be difficult to prove such damage or threat 
due to lack of scientific knowledge and data. Here the precautionary approach can be of 
help. 
 
The precautionary approach gained global endorsement through the 1992 Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development as Principle 15, and also became 
included in the Preamble of the CBD. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration proclaims 
that: 
[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.137 
Because of the uncertainty in the approach’s meaning and its general terms, the 
precautionary approach is commonly thought of a general principle of law, meaning it 
influences treaty interpretation and application.138 The effect of the precautionary 
approach is that it triggers preventive measures earlier139 and lowers the standard of 
proof of risk,140 thus leading to an earlier intervention.  
 
Therefore, it seems that even if a serious threat to marine biological diversity, that 
would trigger the protection of benthic habitats from the process of the laying of 
submarine pipelines through Article 22 (1) of CBD, cannot be proven, the precautionary 
principle could be relied on to protect these habitats. 
 
2.6.4 Consent to the delineation of pipelines’ course as a tool to protect biodiversity 
 
It has been suggested that the way to protect biodiversity from the laying of submarine 
pipelines is through the requirement contained in Article 79 (3) of the LOS Convention 
that the coastal State grant its consent to the delineation of the course of the submarine 
pipeline.141 Paragraph 3 does not elaborate further than only prescribing that such 
consent shall be obtained from the coastal State. Thus, the Convention does not provide 
for possible grounds on which the delineation proposal can be rejected by the coastal 
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State which leaves the reasoning open for the coastal State. While this would favour the 
fulfilment of the obligation to protect marine biodiversity, it also leaves the coastal 
State’s decision open to possible unreasonableness.  
 
It is important here to look at the relationship between paragraphs 2 and 3. While 
paragraph 2 stipulates the cases in which the coastal State can take reasonable measures 
over the submarine pipelines in its EEZ and on its continental shelf, paragraph 3 talks 
about the consent to the delineation of the course of such pipelines. Can the coastal 
State’s consent be viewed as a reasonable measure, extending the requirement in 
paragraph 2 to be reasonable?  
 
Even though the reasonable measures taken by the coastal State with regard to pollution 
and the delineation consent appear in two separate paragraphs, it is notable that it is in 
these two provisions where the Convention makes a distinction between submarine 
cables and pipelines. It seems, therefore, that the drafters of the Convention wanted to 
give extra protection for coastal State interests related to the marine environment from 
submarine pipelines where the likelihood of pollution is admittedly bigger than in the 
case of submarine cables. It follows that the two provisions could possibly be read 
together. The close connection between the two provisions could also be based on the 
order in which they appear in the Article, after each other. Therefore, the logical 
consequence could be drawn that the delineation consent can be included as a 
reasonable measure under paragraph 2.142  
 
If the consent for the delineation can be seen as part of the coastal State’s reasonable 
measures, the coastal State’s obligation not to impede the laying and maintenance of the 
submarine pipelines applies to its consent as well. Therefore, the difference has to be 
maintained between consent for the laying of the submarine pipeline and the consent for 
the delineation of the course of such a pipeline. Claims by some States that they have 
the right of prior consent for the laying, as such, of submarine pipelines, as well as 
cables,143 shall be dismissed. The differentiation between the consent for the laying 
itself and for the delineation of the course is evident from the negotiations of Article 79. 
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Denmark did propose subjecting the laying of submarine pipelines to the consent of the 
coastal State as it saw a marked difference between pipelines and cables. For the latter 
the Danish proposal would have retained the freedom of all States for laying and the 
right of the coastal State to take reasonable measures.144 However, the Danish proposal, 
as we can see, was not accepted.  
 
Furthermore, interpreting the consent to the delineation of the course of the pipeline as 
part of the reasonable measures the coastal State has the right to take, requires the 
granting or the refusal of such a consent to be “reasonable”. What reasonableness 
requires, however, is open and subject to debate.145 In the case of pipelines transiting 
the jurisdiction of the coastal State, such pipelines should be “protected against 
discretionary application of national regulations” and the measures taken “should not go 
beyond what is normally expected”146. Fulfilling these conditions, according to 
Vinogradov, would result in the measures being reasonable.147 Applying this in the case 
of the delineation consent means that the decision to refuse the granting of the 
delineation consent should be based on objective criteria. Furthermore, the coastal State 
cannot prohibit the laying of the pipelines in its entirety even if it relies on objective 
criteria. Such a refusal would make the consent to the delineation of the course of the 
pipeline in effect equal to the consent to the laying of the pipeline. This is not permitted 
by the Convention under Article 79 and seems to be inconsistent with the freedom to lay 
submarine pipelines on the continental shelf enjoyed by all States. 
 
One further element of reasonableness that seems to flow from this argument is that the 
refusal of the consent for delineation of the pipeline should include alternative routeing 
for the said pipeline. However, while in other parts of the Convention, notably in the 
case of the right of transit passage, there is a requirement of “similar convenience with 
respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics” for alternative routes,148 this 
is not so in the case of submarine pipelines. Admittedly, as the Convention does not 
expressly talk about an alternative route for submarine pipelines, it cannot pose 
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requirements for such a route either. However, hydrographical characteristics are of 
great significance when deciding on the route of submarine pipelines.  
 
What the above discussion seems to indicate is that the coastal State has considerable 
leeway to protect parts of its seabed and its marine environment from the process of the 
laying of the submarine pipelines. As Proelss suggests also, the coastal State’s only 
option to “assert its nature conservation interests on the continental shelf”149 is through 
the ex ante denial of permission for the course of the pipeline in line with Article 79 
(3).150  
 
Some suggest that the provision that the course of the pipeline needs to be consented to 
by the coastal State may be incompatible with the notion of freedom.151 However, in the 
present author’s view the requirement of the delineation consent contributes to the 
balancing of the coastal and the laying States’ interests in the EEZ and on the 
continental shelf in as much as such a consent protects the marine environmental 
interests as well as the resource related interests of the coastal State while preserving the 
right of other States to lay submarine pipelines. The coastal State still retains the 
possibility to protect its marine environment not just from pollution from pipelines but 
also from threats to marine biodiversity posed by the laying of pipelines, while the other 
States still enjoy a freedom that may not be impeded and that does not need the consent 
of the coastal State for the laying of pipelines itself.  
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PART III – CONCLUSIONS 
 
3.1 Balancing coastal and laying States’ rights and obligations 
 
As it can be seen from the discussions above, Article 79 contains and supposes rights 
and obligations for both the coastal State and the laying State. This means advancing the 
interests of both while posing restrictions in such a way that the interests of both sides 
could be realised. The balancing of coastal and laying States’ rights and duties is 
achieved by a broad reading of the LOS Convention.  
 
First and foremost, Article 79 guarantees the right of every State to lay submarine 
pipelines. In order to realise this right in practice and to have a functioning pipeline, 
further rights have to be granted to the laying State, namely the right to conduct 
hydrographic surveys without the need for a prior permission from the coastal State, the 
right of maintenance and the right of access. The laying and maintenance of submarine 
pipelines is also protected by the obligation of the coastal State not to impede this 
freedom. Although the coastal State is provided wide powers for the protection of the 
marine environment, the basic obligation not to impede the laying State’s freedom sets 
limits to this. The duty of the coastal State not to infringe on this freedom is included 
into Article 79 (2), although subjected to its legislative power, as well as into Article 78 
(2). But what might give a bigger advantage to the laying State in the protection of its 
interest, is Article 297 (1) (a) that subjects to the dispute settlement mechanism of the 
Convention the disputes concerning “the freedoms and rights of […] the laying of 
submarine cables and pipelines, or […] other internationally lawful uses of the sea 
specified in article 58”,152 unlike some other areas in the EEZ regime.153  
 
Meanwhile, the coastal State’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction had to be respected as 
well. It is especially the protection of the marine environment of the coastal State that 
places a restriction on the laying State’s freedom. The coastal State’s interest in 
                                                 
152 LOSC Article 297 (1) (a); see also Nordquist (1993), pp. 917 and Vinogradov (2009), pp. 285-286 
153 LOSC Article 297 (2) and (3); Rothwell & Churchill (2010), pp. 456 
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preserving its marine environment is protected by its right to legislate for the prevention 
of pollution from pipelines and to give its consent to the route of the pipeline, extending 
to the biodiversity protection. In this area, the developments after the conclusion of the 
LOS Convention play an important part. Furthermore, the safety measures the coastal 
State may take in connection to submarine pipelines are also related to environment 
protection. The laying State’s duty to maintain the pipeline and consequently to protect 
the marine environment acts as a further guarantee for the coastal State. Thus, the 
coastal State’s interests in relation to the marine environment and its protection are 
well-guarded by the Convention and subsequent developments in international law. 
Meanwhile, the coastal State’s extensive rights on the continental shelf for the purposes 
of exploration and exploitation are protected by their nature as sovereign rights. 
However, in the present author’s view, Article 79 does not add much in this regard to 
coastal State powers.  
 
Even though it might seem that the coastal State’s interests are maybe less well-
represented than those of the laying State, one problem can make the exercise of the 
freedom to lay submarine pipelines very difficult. This problem, which can arise from 
Article 79 (2) and the right of each coastal State to take measures for environmental 
purposes over submarine pipelines, is that the course of the pipeline might lead through 
the EEZs of multiple coastal States. Such a submarine pipeline would be subjected to 
multiple “reasonable measures” that together can result in an unreasonable or even 
impossible situation. Thus, the question is whether there can be a way to avoid this 
multiple sets of reasonable measures and a ground for cooperation. 
 
3.2 Ways of resolving the problem of multiple sets of reasonable measures 
 
One way of evading some of the issues that arise when a submarine pipeline traverses 
multiple EEZs in practice has been through agreement on extraterritorial jurisdiction.154 
Citing examples from the North Sea, Roggenkamp gives an introduction into the 
working of the Norwegian pipeline agreements that establish transportation, safety and 
fiscal jurisdiction.155 While these agreements provide for Norwegian extraterritorial 
jurisdiction which paves the way for uniformity in the entire length of the pipeline, the 
                                                 
154 Roggenkamp (1998), pp. 100 
155 Roggenkamp (1998), pp. 103-105 
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situation created by such an agreement seems to be even more complicated than the one 
without it. 
 
First, the various agreements cited by Roggenkamp show that extraterritorial 
jurisdiction can lead to concurrent jurisdiction: the sending State, provided with the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, and the receiving State both have similar rights over the 
same pipeline.156 This results in, for example, concurrent enforcement jurisdiction or the 
difficulty with avoiding double taxation.157 Second, although there might be a uniform 
set of standards for the entire pipeline resulting from the agreement, transit States are 
not party to this agreement.158 These transit States are still entitled by the LOS 
Convention to take their reasonable measures under Article 79 (2).159 Thus, while such 
agreements might function well in the case where the pipeline only traverses two State’s 
EEZs, they do not solve the problem when there are more States involved. 
 
As another mode of trying to resolve the problem, the present author suggests that a 
possible way forward could be based on the common obligation of the coastal State and 
the laying State to preserve the marine environment. As already submitted, the coastal 
State’s duty to preserve the marine environment and biodiversity can be derived from 
reading Article 79 (2) and (3) as well as the CBD and the precautionary principle 
together, while the laying State’s similar duty is manifested in its duty to maintain the 
submarine pipelines as a protective measure. Furthermore, Article 194 (1), though in 
very general terms, provides a possible legal basis for cooperation for the protection of 
the marine environment from all sources. While paragraph 3 of the same article includes 
the areas that the measures taken under the Part XII shall include, this is not an 
exhaustive list as suggested by the inclusion of the phrase “inter alia”160. Especially 
read together with paragraph 5, this could be a basis for a cooperation on the regulation 
of submarine pipelines. Meanwhile, Davenport points at the widely interpreted 
cooperation obligation contained in Part XII and the due regard obligation, in light of 
the general spirit of the Convention for cooperation, to resolve coastal and other State 
                                                 
156 Roggenkamp (1998), pp. 102-103 
157 Roggenkamp (1998), pp. 104-105 
158 Roggenkamp (1998), pp. 105-106 
159 Ibid. 
160 LOSC Article 194 (3), original emphasis 
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interests in a similar case of submarine cables.161 With regard to the obligation to 
protect the marine environment as a basis for cooperation however, it is regrettable that 
the wording of Article 24 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas was not 
transferred into the text of the LOS Convention as that article made it clear that every 
State has the duty to regulate for the purpose of preventing pollution from submarine 
pipelines.162  
 
Although with the intention to scale back the high seas freedom of laying pipelines, 
Crowley has envisaged regional regimes for the regulation of submarine pipelines,163 
“preferably in the context of a detailed regional framework of standards or code of 
conduct rather than by a fixed body of rules”164. This recommendation is supported by 
the present author, for two reasons. First, such a flexible system would indeed be of 
benefit when creating a uniform set of standards for submarine pipelines, especially 
with the view of protecting the marine environment. Evolving technology plays an 
important role in the protection of the marine environment and an effective regime has 
to build on technological development to stay dynamic. Second, a regional regime 
might be preferable to a global one. Consensus on standards can be easier built on a 
regional scale rather than the global, while the lowest common denominator might be 
higher in case of a regional cooperation as well. Furthermore, the environmental effects 
of submarine pipelines are felt more on the regional level in contrast with, for example, 
the effects of ballast water exchange. While the latter needed a global regulation 
because of the scale of shipping, submarine pipelines seem to be built on a sub-global 
scale in the near future, thus affecting regions, rather than globally.  
 
3.3 Ways forward: possible research areas 
 
What has been obvious from the start is that regulation of submarine pipelines is a 
neglected and under-developed part of the law of the sea. What seems to be similarly 
under-developed is the study of this issue area. More research is needed into the subject. 
 
                                                 
161 Davenport (2012), pp. 215 
162 HSC Article 24 
163 Crowley (1987), pp. 58-59 
164 Crowley (1987), pp. 59 
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In the previous section the author has suggested one way of increasing cooperation and 
regulation in the field. However, further, detailed research is needed to show how 
coastal and laying States can work together to form a set of measures that would make it 
easier to lay submarine pipelines, whilst protecting the rights of the coastal States as 
well.  
 
As explained in the Introduction, the scope of the present thesis is limited in both the 
geographical area and in the type of pipelines. Especially interesting is the question of 
environmental protection in relation to submarine pipelines on the high seas and the 
Area. In this area, similarly to what was shown in the case of the EEZ and the 
continental shelf, there seems to be a gap in Part XII. This gap is, however, more acute 
than in the case of the aforementioned zones, as there is no coastal State that could 
provide for measures for the purpose of prevention, reduction and control of pollution 
from pipelines on the high seas. In case of the Area, Article 145 (a) could provide a 
possible legal basis for the Authority to take measures. This provision obliges the 
Authority to adopt rules in case of “harmful effects of […] pipelines […] related to”165 
activities on the Area, possibly opposed to pipelines that are not connected to activities 
on the Area, for example transit pipelines. Furthermore, the conflict of different uses of 
the sea and the Area – laying and maintenance of submarine pipelines and exploitation 
of the Area’s resources – has to be examined as well.166 Similarly to the case with 
geographical areas, the present thesis leaves research open into other types of pipelines 
as well.  
 
As the LOS Convention points out in its Preamble, “the problems of ocean space are 
closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole”167. The present research has 
also dealt with different issue areas from marine scientific research to exploration and 
exploitation to protection of the marine environment. Especially because the regulation 
as well as the study of submarine pipelines is under-developed, the analysis had to 
include many other fields and consider problems of these. To be able to give answers to 
questions relating to submarine pipelines, the study of related fields also needs to be 
more advanced. No research into submarine pipelines can disregard advancements in 
                                                 
165 LOSC Article 145 (a) 
166 Davenport (2012), pp. 216 
167 LOSC Preamble, Paragraph 3 
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the areas of the aforementioned problems, and should strive to contribute to these too as 
much as possible. This way we can treat the challenges of the law of the sea as a whole. 
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